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Treating People With Information: an Analysis and
Review of Approaches to Communicating Health Risk Information
Alexander J. Rothman* and Marc T. Kiviniemi
Department of Psychology
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis

The communication of risk information is a fundamental aspect of
nearly all health promotion interventions. However, no consensus exists regarding the most eﬀective way to provide people with risk information. We will review and evaluate the relative merits of two approaches to risk communication. One approach relies on the presentation
of numerical information regarding the probability of a health problem
occurring, whereas the other relies on the presentation of information
about the antecedents and consequences of a health problem. Because
people have considerable diﬃculty understanding and using quantitative information, the eﬀectiveness of interventions that rely solely on
numerical probability information has been limited. Interventions that
provide people with a broader informational context in which to think
about a health problem have had greater success systematically inﬂuencing perceptions of personal risk but have several important limitations.
However, before any ﬁnal conclusions can be drawn regarding the relative merits of diﬀerent communication strategies, investigators must
agree on the speciﬁc criteria that should be used to identify an eﬀective
intervention. [Monogr Natl Cancer Inst 1999;25:44-51]
Because of the inﬂuence that perceptions of personal risk are
thought to have on people’s health practices (1,2), the communication of health risk information has become a prominent part
of health prevention eﬀorts. People are frequently provided with
numerical information about the probability that a speciﬁc pattern
of behavior (e.g., smoking) will lead to a particular health problem
(e.g., lung cancer). Although the dissemination of this information
has increased public awareness of potential health problems, its effect on perceptions of personal risk for these problems has been
less dramatic (3).
Why has this information had such a limited eﬀect on people’s
beliefs about their own personal vulnerability? A possible explanation is that people routinely misunderstand numerical information
about the probability that an outcome will occur (4). This confusion leads people to misinterpret the implications of the information and, thus, undermines any systematic eﬀect it might otherwise have on their beliefs and behavior. Moreover, people are not
passive, unbiased processors of information about their health status (5). They welcome favorable information about their health
but often engage in strategies that minimize or discount unfavorable health information—strategies that, in turn, blunt any inﬂuence this information might have on decision making and behavior [e.g., (6-8)].
In light of these cognitive and motivational barriers, what is the
best way to communicate health risk information so that people
* Corresponding author, Email: rothm001@umn.edu.

both understand it and recognize its implications for their own
risk status? We will examine several methods that have been used
to communicate health risk information and evaluate their eﬀect
on perceptions of personal risk. Our goal is to identify conditions
that maximize the desired impact of health risk information on
people’s health beliefs. The degree to which risk-based interventions aﬀect people’s behavioral practices is reviewed elsewhere in
this volume (see Gerrard et al. [this monograph] and McCaul and
Tulloch [this monograph]).
Before reviewing the merits of diﬀerent approaches to risk communication, we consider two issues that are fundamental to any
assessment of risk communication strategies. First, how do people think about and form judgments of health risks? Inter ventions
designed to help people assess their risk will be successful only
if consideration is given to how people process diﬀerent types of
health risk information. Second, what is the most appropriate way
to assess the impact of a health risk intervention? An intervention
could inﬂuence knowledge about a risk factor, beliefs about personal risk, perceptions of how one’s own risk compares with the
average person’s risk, or intentions to act to reduce one’s risk. Because these diﬀerent measures can provide quite diﬀerent impressions of people’s beliefs, the speciﬁc set of criteria an investigator
chooses to rely on can aﬀect whether or not a particular intervention is perceived to be eﬀective (3,9).

How Do People Think About Health Risks?
People are quite willing to provide estimates of personal health
risks, but what these estimates reveal about their health beliefs is
unclear. Although risk estimates are typically interpreted as the
probability with which people believe a health problem will occur, there is considerable evidence that they reﬂect a broader set
of cognitive and aﬀective beliefs. Analyses of how people interpret
and compare health risks have consistently revealed that lay perceptions of risk are not simply a function of probability information but rather are aﬀected by the beliefs people hold about both
the antecedents of the problem (for example: “Is it voluntary?” “Is
it controllable?”) and its consequences [for example: “Can it be detected?” “Would it be catastrophic?”; see (10,11)].
Why might people’s perceptions of risk be aﬀected by information about the antecedents and consequences of a health problem? First of all, people think about health problems in relation
to their causes and consequences and, in fact, health information is organized in memory primarily around these two classes of
information (12). Moreover, some investigators have proposed that
people come to understand their risk on the basis of their ability to
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mentally simulate or imagine themselves experiencing the problem (13,14). Thus, information will aﬀect judgments of risk to the
extent that it enables one to imagine that “it could happen to me.”
In the context of this framework, knowledge of both the antecedents and the consequences of a health problem has clear informational value.
Antecedent information helps people think about how a health
problem could develop. It renders salient the speciﬁc factors that
either promote or prevent the development of a health problem
[e.g., (15)]. Moreover, it helps people recognize the links between the very things that they do—or do not do— and unwanted health outcomes [e.g., (16)]. Whereas information about the
antecedents of a health problem underscores how people can alter
their chances of developing a health problem, information about
consequences emphasizes what it would be like to actually have
the health problem. Vivid information about the consequences of
the health problem helps people to recognize the severity of what
could happen to them [e.g., (17,18)] and, moreover, that it actually has happened to people just like them [e.g., (19)]. Thus, both
types of information provide useful and nonoverlapping material
to help individuals assess and interpret their risk.
Even though numerical probability information provides people with a precise description of their risk, its informational value
is unclear. In and of itself, providing people with numerical probability information about a health problem (for example:
“You have a one in 500 chance of developing breast cancer”) is
likely to have little eﬀect on their ability to imagine either what
might happen to them or how it might occur. In fact, research
has shown that people tend to underutilize probability information except when it provides explicit causal information about
how a particular event will occur (20,21). Given that particular types of information about a health problem may have greater informational value than others, any evaluation of health risk
communications must consider the characteristics of the specific information provided. In particular, messages that exclusively provide people with numerical probability information need
to be diﬀerentiated from those that provide people with more
general information about the antecedents or consequences of a
health problem.

Evaluating The Impact of Health Risk
Information
How does one determine whether a health risk message has
been eﬀective? Investigators have assessed people’s knowledge of
the speciﬁc risks posed by a behavior (for example: “How does
smoking aﬀect people’s risk for lung cancer?”), beliefs about the
absolute magnitude of their own risk (for example:
“Given your current smoking habit, what is your risk for developing lung cancer?”), and beliefs about how their risk compares
with that of a speciﬁed comparison group (for example: “How
does your risk for developing lung cancer compare with that of the
typical smoker?”).
Evidence that people are aware of the risks posed by a particular
pattern of behavior may indicate the successful communication of
health risk information, but it cannot tell us whether people recognize the risk as personally relevant. Direct measures of personal risk are needed to answer this question. However, it is not clear
whether the criterion for an eﬀective intervention should be based
on changing absolute levels of personal risk or in modifying com-
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parative risk. Numerous studies have revealed that people report
their own risk of experiencing a health problem to be less than
that of the average person and that this occurs even when they are
given information about the average person’s risk or behavior [e.g.,
(22,23)]. This optimistic bias has been taken to indicate that people systematically underestimate important personal health risks
and, thus, considered a barrier to the adoption of precautionary
behaviors [(24); but see (13)]. However, the absence of any empirical evidence that people’s behavioral decisions are related diﬀerentially to perceptions of absolute and comparative risk limits any
conclusion that can be drawn as to which measure oﬀers the most
informative assessment of people’s beliefs.

Different Approaches to Communicating
Health Risk Information
We now turn to a brief review of the literature on communicating health risk information. The review covers studies that
have systematically compared diﬀerent methods of communicating
risk information, all of which were developed to aﬀect people’s beliefs about health risks that were associated with either their own
behavior (e.g., smoking or sexual behavior) or their environment
(e.g., radon). None of the studies included in this review addressed
the communication of risks posed by diﬀerent medical treatments.
We distinguish between two general approaches to communicating health risk information: a numerical probability-based
approach and a contextualized approach. A probability-based approach focuses on the presentation of numerical information regarding the probability of a given risk occurring. The primary goal
of studies that have utilized this approach has been to identify the
most eﬀective way to communicate risk information. Speciﬁcally,
these studies seek to determine how diﬀerent presentation formats
aﬀect people’s ability to understand and, in some cases, use the numerical information provided. These interventions have ranged
from the straightforward communication of a numerical probability (for example: “You have a one in 500 chance of developing cancer in the next 10 years”) to presentation formats designed
to heighten the salience or impact of the statistical information.
Some of the more innovative presentation strategies have involved
framing the information in terms of how frequently someone will
die in a community as a result of a given risk (25) or presenting
risk information in such a way that it can be compared with the
magnitude of other risks (26).
A second approach to risk communication has focused on providing people with an informational context in which to understand
and interpret their risk. The deﬁning feature of a contextualized
approach is that it provides people with information about the antecedents and/or the consequences of a potential health problem.
A variety of intervention methods can be considered contextual.
Some interventions have emphasized the antecedents of a health
problem by providing people with speciﬁc information regarding
the link between a health problem and their own prior behavior or
medical history [e.g., (16)]. Other interventions have used testimonials from people who have experienced the health problem to
convey information about how the problem developed and/or how
it has aﬀected their lives [e.g., (19,27,28)]. Other contextualized
interventions have focused on providing people with information
or images that render the negative consequences of the health risk
salient and vivid [e.g., (29,30)]. In almost every case, the primary goal of the intervention has been to increase people’s recog-
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nition of the risk posed by their behavior or environment. Thus,
these interventions have been developed not only to communicate risk information, but also to do it in as persuasive a manner
as possible.
There are several criteria that an investigator can use to determine the eﬀectiveness of any given communication strategy.
First, an eﬀective strategy might lead people to be better informed
about the likelihood of a health problem. Interventions that emphasize the presentation of probability information have focused
primarily on this criterion. Alternatively, an eﬀective strategy could
appropriately alter people’s perceptions of personal or comparative
risk. Third, an eﬀective strategy could be one that heightens people’s interest in relevant primary prevention behaviors, independent of changes in risk perceptions. Empirical tests of contextually
based interventions have focused primarily on the latter two criteria. Whenever possible, we report the eﬀect an intervention method has had on both absolute and comparative measures of risk as
well as whether changes in risk perceptions were associated with
changes in other risk-relevant beliefs.

Impact of Probability-Based Approaches
When investigators provide numerical probability information, they rely on the premise that people will respond to a given
probability in a consistent manner. That is, a 10% risk should be
interpreted as a 10% risk, regardless of whether it is presented as
a percentage or an odds ratio or whether it is presented numerically or pictorially. Unfortunately, empirical tests of probability-based communications have typically failed to support this
premise [e.g., (31,32)]. People have diﬃculty recalling probability information accurately [e.g., (33,34)], they make errors when
asked to transform percentages into proportions or vice versa
(e.g., Lipkus I: unpublished data [numeracy survey], 1998), and
they confuse information about the frequency of a event with its
rate of occurrence [e.g., (35)]. Thus, it would appear that people cannot reliably understand and interpret numerical probability statistics.
In fact, there is direct evidence that people do not appreciate
some of the fundamental assumptions underlying probabilities.
For example. Black et al. (36) reported that a substantial number
of women estimated that their risk of developing breast cancer was
less than their risk of developing and dying from it. People also
have diﬃculty understanding and estimating cumulative risks associated with repeated patterns of behavior [e.g., contraception use
(37,38)]. More broadly, Schwartz et al. (39) assessed people’s familiarity with basic probability and numerical concepts (i.e., numeracy). They found not only that people’s understanding of these
mathematical concepts was quite poor, but also that their ability to
accurately interpret numerical information regarding breast cancer
and mammography was systematically dependent on their level of
numeracy.
People’s beliefs are also sensitive to the speciﬁc numbers used
to illustrate a risk. For example, people may be more concerned
about a potential health problem when they are told that a pattern of behavior will increase their risk of dying by 30% than if
they are told that it will change their risk of dying from one in
10000 to 1.3 in 10000 (11).1 Several studies have shown that people respond diﬀerentially to a ratio when it is expressed as 1:10
versus 10:100 and that this occurs even when they understand
that the two ratios illustrate the same probability (40,41). More-

over, Yamagishi (42) found that people rated a health problem
as riskier when they were informed that it kills 1286 of 10000
people (12.86%) compared with 24.14 of 100 people (24.14%).
It would appear that people fail to consider the relevant sample
size when processing information regarding the number of people who have developed or died from a health problem [but see
(31)].
In addition to the diﬃculties people have with the mathematical properties of probabilities, investigators must grapple with
the fact that people ﬁnd it diﬃcult to ascribe meaning to a given level of risk. What does it mean to be told that you have a 1
% chance of having a disabled child or that your risk of dying
from cancer has increased from one in 10000 to 1.3 in 10000?
Although these statistics may be extremely precise, people’s responses to this information are anything but precise. When provided with numerical estimates, people appear to spontaneously transform the probability information into discrete categories
[e.g., high or low risk (43,44)]. To the extent that people make
decisions based on the belief that their risk is either high or low,
the speciﬁc numerical probabilities they provide may not be particularly reliable or informative. Consistent with this analysis,
Windschitl and Wells (45) found that people’s numerical probability estimates failed to predict their preferences and behavioral
intentions, whereas the verbal labels they used to describe the
likelihood of an outcome consistently predicted the same set of
decisions.
Because people have diﬃculty ascribing meaning to a probability estimate, they are acutely sensitive to available comparison
information. In fact, when asked what information would help
them understand a health risk, individuals typically request comparisons between the probability of diﬀerent risks (46). Evidence
that people readily construe risks in a comparative frame comes
from studies that have manipulated the comparison information
provided. Klein (47) has shown that people’s aﬀective reactions
to information about their risk depend on how their level of personal risk compares with the average risk, independent of their
absolute level of personal risk. Studies that have presented risks
along a continuum have shown that people’s interpretation of the
same numerical probability depended on whether it was placed
at the high end or the low end of the continuum (26). People’s
interpretation of the implications of their behavior is similarly
aﬀected by whether a response format leads them to believe that
the frequency of their behavior is above or below the perceived
norm (Rothman AJ, Haddock G, Schwarz N: manuscript submitted for publication). Of course, the manner in which risk information is presented is but one source of information that can
aﬀect how people interpret or use a given probability. Research
has shown that people’s knowledge, personality, and goals can
also inﬂuence their interpretation of what a particular risk means
[e.g., (48-50)].
The primary appeal of health risk communications that present numerical probability information is that they oﬀer people
precise information regarding the probability that a health problem will occur. However, the eﬀectiveness of this communication
approach is constrained by people’s inability to accurately interpret and use numerical probabilities. In fact, the very strategies
that people employ to render probability information more useful strip it of the very precision that this intervention approach
oﬀers.
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Impact of Contextualized Approaches
In light of the limitations of a probability-based approach to
communicating risk information, we now consider an alternative
method that provides people with information to assist them in
understanding the personal implications of a given health risk. Recall that, although risk is typically deﬁned as the numerical probability of a given event occurring, lay conceptions of risk are based
on a much richer set of cognitive and aﬀective beliefs. When a
health problem is being considered, information about the numerical probability of a risk is viewed as insuﬃcient;
people are interested in information about what causes a health
problem, about the severity of its consequences, and about what
can be done to either prevent or treat the problem (51,52). This
information is considered valuable because it enables people to
develop a mental model that delineates the personal relevance of
a given risk—what might cause one to develop a health problem
and the potential costs of developing that problem.
Antecedents. Interventions that heighten the salience of factors that place people at risk for adverse outcomes have typically
involved directing their attention to relevant aspects of their behavior or personal attributes. For instance, Gerrard et al. (53) had
female Marines review their sexual and contraceptive histories prior to assessing their risks for pregnancy and human immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV) infection. This behavioral review heightened
judgments of personal risk for HIV infection and, in some cases, personal risk for pregnancy. Other interventions have provided
individuals with personalized information about the link between
a health problem and speciﬁc behavioral or personal characteristics. This strategy has been somewhat successful in rendering both
optimistic and pessimistic misperceptions about comparative risk
more accurate (16), although other investigators (54) have found
that directing people’s attention toward potential risk factors failed
to reduce optimistic perceptions of comparative risk.
Some investigators have emphasized the need to diﬀerentiate
between the absolute amount of risk-relevant information people can bring to mind and the relative ease with which that information is recalled. Traditionally, interventions have assumed that
the more risk-increasing factors people bring to mind, the more at
risk they will feel. However, the experienced ease with which information comes to mind has also been shown to systematically
aﬀect judgment [e.g., (55)}. Speciﬁcally, people who have easily
brought a few risk-increasing factors to mind may infer a greater
degree of personal risk than do people who had diﬃculty bringing to mind a larger number of risk factors. Both Rothman and
Schwarz (15) and Raghubir and Menon (56) have successfully used this approach to heighten perceptions of personal risk, although only Raghubir and Menon obtained a reduction in participants’ optimistic perceptions of comparative risk.2 Perceptions of
personal risk are also sensitive to the relative ease or diﬃculty with
which risk-decreasing factors come to mind. In this case, having
had diﬃculty generating a large number of risk-decreasing factors
can lead to increased perceptions of personal risk (15).
Consequences. Investigators have developed two diﬀerent
strategies to increase the salience of outcomes associated with a
given health problem. In each case, the goal of the intervention
has been to increase the personal relevance of the risk by helping people to recognize that the health problem could happen
to them. Sherman et al. (57) provided people with a set of symptoms that were either easy or diﬃcult to bring to mind and ob-
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served that the ease with which people could imagine themselves
experiencing the symptoms of a disease heightened their perceptions of personal vulnerability. More recently, interventions have
tried to emphasize the personal relevance of a health problem
by highlighting the similarities between members of the targeted audience and people who have had personal experience with a
health problem. For example, the presentation of personal testimonials by HIV-positive individuals has led to increased perceptions of personal risk—but only when people perceived themselves to be similar to the person providing the testimony [e.g.,
(27,28); see also (58)]. In fact, Gump and Kulik (28) have demonstrated that the level of personal risk people will recognize depends on the degree to which they are able to see themselves as
diﬀerent from the infected person.
A second approach to highlighting the outcomes associated
with a given risk has involved messages that graphically illustrate
the severity of the consequences associated with a health problem
[(8,18); see Salovey et al. (1) for a recent review]. For example, Sutton and Hallett (30) successfully raised perceptions of personal
risk related to seat belt use by showing people graphic scenes of car
crashes and mortuaries. Similar eﬀects have been found for images
that depict outcomes related to cigarette smoking [e.g., (29,59)].
Although there is no empirical support for the premise that the
disturbing nature of these appeals would lead people to minimize
the personal relevance of a given health threat, people must know
how they can respond to the health threat if a fear appeal is going
to elicit a change in behavior (18,60).
Given the ﬁndings obtained across a range of experimental
paradigms, it would appear that interventions that render either
the antecedents or the consequences of a health problem salient
can have a meaningful eﬀect on perceptions of personal risk. Although people may be responsive to information about what could
happen to them and how it might occur, the speciﬁc processes by
which this information aﬀects risk beliefs have yet to be well speciﬁed. We consider this issue as well as potential limitations to this
communication strategy in the following section.

What Have We Learned and What Do We Still
Need to Know?
On the basis of the empirical research covered in our review,
we believe that several conclusions can be drawn regarding the
communication of health risk information. First, people do not
respond in a consistent manner to communication strategies that
rely solely on the presentation of numerical risk information. From
the perspective of an expert, the precision aﬀorded by a numerical probability estimate may be appealing, but its inﬂuence on lay
people’s beliefs and behavior is anything but precise. Any systematic impact that this information might have on decision making
and behavior is undermined by people’s inability to understand
the meaning of a speciﬁc probability and their resulting computational errors. In an attempt to ascribe meaning to a given risk,
people’s inferences are strongly aﬀected by information that is accessible at the time of judgment. Thus, there is considerable variability in how people respond to probability-based risk messages.3 Interventions that provide people with information about the
causes or consequences of a particular health problem appear to
have a more consistent inﬂuence on perceptions of personal risk
precisely because they systematically control the information people have available when drawing inferences about their personal
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risk. Moreover, the observation that contextually based approaches
to providing risk information are more eﬀective is consistent with
the broader ﬁnding that people are more likely to base their judgment on concrete, case-based information than on abstract, statistical information [e.g., (63,64)].

Recognizing the Limitations of a Contextually Based
Communication Strategy
Although interventions that have utilized a contextually based
approach to communicating risk information have had some success aﬀecting perceptions of personal risk, investigators cannot assume that people will always respond appropriately to the health
information provided. Because people want to maintain a favorable impression of their health status, they may, if possible, selectively attend to information about their health. For example, when
asked to consider how their own risk for a health problem compares with that of the average person, people selectively bring to
mind health practices that make them look good (65). In a similar manner, people have a better memory for behavioral guidelines that place their behavior in a favorable (healthy) light than
for those that place it in an unfavorable (unhealthy) light (66). Finally, when asked to consider their own behavioral practices, people may selectively focus on the preventive actions that they have
adopted rather than on the risks that they have taken [(53,67);
for a complete discussion of these ﬁndings, see Gerrard et al., this
monograph].
Even when people do attend to information about potential
health risks, they may search for ﬂaws in the message or adopt
higher standards for evaluating the quality of the information
(6,8,68). In situations where risk information cannot be refuted
directly, people may adjust other beliefs in an attempt to counter the undesirable implications of the risk message (7,69,70).
For example, Gerrard et al. (7) observed that, even though young
adults increased their perceptions of risk in response to an increase
in their risk behaviors, they also increased their assessment of the
prevalence of these behaviors (thereby normalizing the practice)
and decided that the health implications of these behaviors were
less relevant to future behavioral decisions.
However, the importance of people’s attempts to minimize
the implications of the risk information is unclear. Several studies
have observed that, even when people act to minimize a health
threat, they remain interested in information about how to address
the problem [e.g., (71-73)]. For example, people who learned that
they had borderline high cholesterol perceived high cholesterol to
be a less serious health problem than did those who were told that
they had low cholesterol, but they still expressed greater interest
in taking steps to lower their cholesterol (72). There is even evidence that interventions can prompt changes in behavioral intentions independent of observed changes in risk perceptions. Gump
and Kulik (28) found that the HIV status of a man describing his
experiences inﬂuenced intentions to be HIV tested independent
of changes in perceptions of personal risk. Similarly, Evers et al.
(27) found that heterosexuals reported stronger intentions to be
HIV tested regardless of the sexual orientation of an HIV-positive
speaker, whereas they changed their perceptions of personal risk
only after having listened to a heterosexual speaker.
The observed dissociation between people’s risk beliefs and
their behavioral intentions should not be interpreted as a sign that
changes in people’s behavior can be elicited in the absence of in-

formation about health risks. Information about a potential health
risk may be necessary to initiate the self-regulatory processes that
underlie an appropriate behavioral response. However, people may
independently regulate their aﬀective and behavioral responses
to a health threat, as suggested by Leventhal’s Parallel Response
Model (12,18). Speciﬁcally, people may choose to respond both in
ways that alleviate their distress about a potential health problem
(thereby attenuating any change in perceived risk) and in ways that
serve to reduce the likelihood that they might develop the health
problem (thereby eliciting changes in behavior). It is precisely because people may respond to health risk information in myriad ways that investigators who test interventions must attend not
only to changes in people’s perceptions of the chance of a health
risk occurring, but also to changes in people’s beliefs about the implications of that risk and how they intend to respond to that risk.
In the absence of an assessment of these ancillary beliefs, it may be
diﬃcult to draw conclusions regarding the practical signiﬁcance of
any observed change (or lack thereof ) in perceived risk.

Moving Beyond the Perceived Magnitude of One’s Risk
At present, health risk interventions are primarily evaluated on
the basis of their ability to inﬂuence perceptions of risk. Although
the possibility that behavioral intentions will change independent
of any change in perceived risk indicates that investigators need to
employ a broad array of indicators when evaluating an intervention, consideration should also be given to the speciﬁc manner in
which changes in perceived risk are assessed. In fact, the apparent
dissociation between risk beliefs and behavioral intentions may reﬂect, in part, the ways that investigators have operationalized perceived risk. Almost all measures of risk perception have been designed to detect changes in the perceived likelihood of a person’s
risk. However, what if an intervention is eﬀective not because it
leads people to believe something is more likely to happen but instead because it causes them to be more concerned about a given
risk? For example, a person might still report a 1 % risk of developing a health problem but be considerably more concerned about
that level of risk. Current measures of risk perceptions are not able
to detect changes in the meaning people ascribe to a speciﬁc level of risk. The inclusion of measures of worry and concern about a
health risk might help address this problem. In fact, McCaul et al.
(74) have found that how worried a woman was about developing
breast cancer predicted mammography screening utilization even
after controlling for her perception of personal risk. It might also
be useful to assess whether an intervention has altered the salience
or accessibility of a person’s risk perceptions. Interventions might
prove to be eﬀective not because they increase people’s perceptions
of risk but because they increase the probability that beliefs about
personal risk will come to mind when people are faced with a behavioral decision.

Toward a Model of Health Risk Communication
Despite the fact that investigators have assessed the merits of a
range of risk communication strategies, our limited understanding
of how diﬀerent aspects of a health risk message aﬀect people’s beliefs and behaviors constrains any recommendations that can be
formulated. The observation that information regarding both the
antecedents and consequences of a health problem can reliably affect people’s risk beliefs may oﬀer a base on which a conceptual model of risk communication can be built. Information about
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the antecedents and consequences of a health problem is believed
to be eﬀective because it enables people to imagine that “it could
happen to them” (13,14). Information about the consequences of
a health problem helps people to recognize what could happen
to them, whereas information about the antecedents of a health
problem helps people to understand how it could happen. Because people rely on these two dimensions (i.e., cause and consequences) to structure their mental models of health problems
(12), information about the antecedents and consequences of a
health problem has considerable informational value and can be
readily utilized.
When people receive information about the consequences of a
health problem, the implications of a potential health risk are rendered vivid and concrete. Although people may more readily recognize the severity of a potential health problem and may even be
motivated to take precautionary action, imagining what it would
be like to have a health problem does not provide people with sufﬁcient information about how to address the potential problem.
In the absence of information about how to eﬀectively deal with a
health problem, information about consequences may elicit greater feelings of personal risk and concern but, at the same time, may
cause people to feel less conﬁdent about their ability to deal with
a potential health threat. Because people need to know what they
want to avoid and how they can go about minimizing their risk,
merely drawing people’s attention to the undesired consequences of a health problem is not likely to be an eﬀective way to elicit
risk-reducing behavior (18,75).
Information about the antecedents of a health problem directs
people’s attention toward the factors that determine whether or
not the problem will develop. Because antecedent information informs people about the speciﬁc factors that cause one’s risk to increase, it can simultaneously provide them with information about
what, if anything, they can do to minimize their risk. Thus, antecedent-based risk interventions oﬀer the possibility of increasing
not only people’s perceptions of personal risk but also their conﬁdence that they can cope with a potential health threat (18,75).
However, in and of itself, information about what causes a health
problem to develop provides people with little information regarding the severity of the potential problem. People may learn how to
minimize their risk, but in the absence of information about the
severity of the problem they may not be suﬃciently motivated to
take action. Given that information about the consequences of a
health problem provides people with a clear reason for taking action, the integration of information about the antecedents and the
consequences of a health problem may prove to be an eﬀective
way to maximize the impact of a health risk intervention. Studies are needed that systematically examine the eﬀect that the proposed integrative framework has on people’s aﬀective and behavioral responses to a health risk communication, with speciﬁc attention paid to the factors that are thought to mediate the impact
of each type of information.
The development of a more precise understanding of how
people respond to a health risk message should also help investigators anticipate a priori what factors are likely to moderate
the message’s impact. Given the heterogeneity of the health
risks people must deal with, it is unlikely that a single intervention approach will prove eﬀective for all health problems. Only
with the formulation of a conceptual model of risk communication will we be in a position to predict whether an eﬀective inter-
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vention strategy can be transferred successfully from one health
domain to another. In a similar manner, even though studies
have revealed that individual diﬀerences in personality and in
prior experience can inﬂuence how people process health risk
information [e.g, (15,49)}, the extent to which these moderating
factors generalize across health domains or interact with other aspects of the intervention strategy is not yet known (but see
Gerrard et al., this monograph).

Can the Informational Value of Probability Information Be
Increased?
Contextually based interventions have proven capable of inﬂuencing perceptions of risk, but these methodologies lack the precision aﬀorded by a numerical estimate of the probability that an
event will occur. Could an intervention integrate the presentation
of probability information with information about the causes and
consequences of a health problem? This approach would oﬀer people precise information about the magnitude of their risk, but it
would do so in a context that clariﬁes the implications of this information for their health. However, any intervention strategy that
depends on the precision aﬀorded by numerical probability information must confront the diﬃculties people have when forced to
use this information (39). If inter ventions are going to rely on people’s ability to use probability information, then investigators need
to provide them with the skills required to use the information accurately and appropriately. People need to know not only how to
interpret numerical information about a speciﬁc health risk, but
also how to gauge the degree to which adopting a particular precautionary behavior will aﬀect these probabilities. Although there
is considerable evidence that people can be taught to use basic statistical principles [e.g., (76,77)], the feasibility of integrating basic
lessons in numeracy into interventions that provide people with
health risk information remains untested.

Final Thoughts
If we expect people to make informed decisions about their
health, information must be communicated to them in a manner
that they can understand and use. Although scientiﬁc advances
continue to provide increasingly more precise information about
the health risks that people face, there has been little consensus
as to the most eﬀective way to communicate this information. On
the basis of our review of the literature, we believe that intervention approaches that help people understand how a health problem could develop (i.e., its antecedents) and recognize what could
happen to them (i.e., its consequences) oﬀer the most eﬀective way
to communicate health risk information. However, the strength of
this assessment is tempered by the absence of studies that have
systematically compared the merits of diﬀerent intervention approaches. A new generation of inter vention studies is needed that
will allow investigators to assess directly the relative impact of different risk communication strategies. However, the identiﬁcation
of eﬀective communication strategies is not suﬃcient. Investigators need to determine not only what strategies are eﬀective but
also why they are eﬀective. Substantial progress in our ability to
transfer successful interventions across both diﬀerent health domains and diﬀerent participant populations will come only after
we have developed a more precise understanding of how people
process and utilize health risk information.
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Notes
1

Although this observation is frequently cited, no direct test of this
claim could be identiﬁed. However, Halpern et al. (31) have found
that people perceived oral contraceptives to pose a greater health risk
when the information was presented as a relative risk (e.g., 415%
greater risk of dying) than when it was presented as a base rate (e.g.,
one in 12,000 die).
2
Although people primarily rely on the ease with which information comes to mind, they will base their judgment on the speciﬁc
content of the recalled information when they are motivated to process the information in a more systematic and detailed manner (15)
or when their subjective experience has been rendered nondiagnostic (55).
3
0f course, conﬂicting interpretations of information are not limited
to numerical presentations of information. Several investigators have
found there to be considerable variability in the values that people assign to quantitative labels such as frequently, sometimes, or occasionally [e.g., (61,62)].
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